NASA Plans Put America At Risk
Unassessed Uncertainty Involved For the Future of American Human Spaceflight.
NASA now likely has much more risk to the long term sustainability and safety of its premier human spaceflight program (ISS) than the normally risk averse Agency would desire or admit to. Flight crew access to and from the ISS for the next 5 or more years is dependent on a single flight system (Soyuz), until one of the commercially developed American low earth orbit transportation systems demonstrates sufficient reliability to take on that responsibility. The widespread euphoria over the recent successes of SpaceX and the highly optimistic expectations for COTS operational readiness somewhat contrasts with the reality of the history of past rocket development programs. The cost, schedule, and program management difficulties and technical development issues associated with NASA's own Constellation program and the James Webb Space Telescope program most recently have validated that history.
After the Columbia accident, NASA was extremely fortunate that the Soyuz system could sustain the ISS until the Orbiter returned to flight status. There is no planned backup available for the Soyuz after retirement of the Space Shuttle flight system for five or perhaps even several more years.
There is a non-zero probability that a random event or a scenario comprised of a series of seemingly unconnected events could prevent the Soyuz or a reliable COTS alternate capability from being available for transporting crews safely to and from the ISS for a significant length of time perhaps resulting in abandonment of the Station. Reliance on the Soyuz for this extended timeframe is very unpopular with many Americans of all stripes for a variety of reasons. If this capability becomes unreliable or perhaps utilized as some form of political leverage, NASA now has no other options available to sustain its planned ISS operations program for perhaps a long period of time.
We know that there is tangible uncertainty and risk involved in the current strategy to rely on a single human transportation system for long term access to the ISS that is provided by a foreign entity. What is the likelihood that a random event or a here-to-fore unconsidered scenario might occur that could cause a significant impact to the ISS Program? Second, are the impacts of the potential consequences acceptable to America; and what are the best mitigation strategies to address this risk? What does NASA and the Government need to do to characterize the risks involved to provide useable information for use by the decision makers who accountable for this policy, and to provide transparency and confidence to the affected stakeholders?
What are some of these non-zero probability events that could present major risk?
1. Spacecraft systems failures/deficiencies (hardware/software) or supply chain interruptions.
2. Ground support system failures, aging institutions and facilities.
3. Political Instability or irresolvable policy differences affecting the continuity of planned arrangements
4. Fire that disrupts and disables key manufacturing, utilities, or operations capabilities.
5. Terrorist attacks to key capabilities, physical, cyber, etc.
6. Major weather disaster that impacts key manufacturing or operations capabilities, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant as an example. .
7. Human error that initiates a scenario comprised of events which renders the Soyuz system unavailable for a lengthy period.
8. The uncertainty in performance of the potential COTS providers being able to provide a safe and reliable human transportation system to support the ISS in a reasonable time frame. In comparison, the development of the Orion led by NASA, also a capsule flight system with significant legacy utilization, was taking NASA greater than 10 years to realize a LEO capability to support the ISS.
This is a partial listing of potential causes and is not intended to be a complete list of scenarios that might result in the Soyuz and/or the COTS capability being unavailable for human access to the ISS.
What are the potential adverse consequences that might result from failure of the Soyuz system to be able to fly crews to and from the ISS for an extended period of time?
1. Loss of life.
2. Major asset loss. The U.S. has approximately $100 B invested in the ISS that is at risk for loss. Other nations have varying significant investments as well.
3. Loss of prestige for America due to failure to be able to sustain the ISS.
4. Uncontrolled decay and entry of the ISS
5. Acceleration of the wide spread perceived decline and/or actual decline of America's current world leadership in human spaceflight technology and operations.
6. Loss of confidence in NASA, its leadership; and perhaps future support for initiating new future programs.
7. Loss of momentum in the ISS based science programs including loss of the accrued sunk investments in dollars and human capital.
8. Accelerated erosion of the skills and capabilities required to move the human exploration of space forward.
9. Loss of interest in space science and space exploration by the young people who are contemplating a science or aerospace engineering career resulting in further decline in America's capability to initiate and carry out challenging spaceflight and technological programs. (This is already happening – just talk to some science and engineering majors now in college.)
Again, a partial listing.
Who are the stakeholders and policy makers that are potentially impacted by this undefined risk level?
1. The American taxpayers who are committed to American leadership in space and depend on NASA leadership and the Government to make reliable decisions for the betterment of the Nation.
2. The governing Administration.
3. The Congress who appear to be legislating the way forward for human spaceflight by their actions (e.g. Orion & SLS).
4. NASA leadership and its people who have committed their lives and careers to the continued development of human spaceflight..
5. NASA's Contractors that make up much of the skilled experience base necessary to conceive, develop, manufacture, and operate the systems that are required for space exploration..
6. The Commercial Space Transportation investors.
Again, a partial listing, but the stakeholder community is much larger than NASA alone.
How should NASA proceed?
NASA should follow its own policy and procedural directives imposed on its own programs and conduct a detailed risk assessment of its plans in order to understand the risk level associated with the decision to rely solely on the Soyuz flight system for human access and return to the ISS for the next five + years. Since the risks involved are so significant to the future of America, the risk analysis and assessment should be accomplished by an organization independent of the NASA decision makers who are involved in the planning and implementation of current the policy of long term reliance on a flight system provided by a foreign nation to sustain the ISS. In order to avoid a conflict of interest, the use of NASA's current contractors should not be utilized for such an assessment. Perhaps the risk assessment should be overseen and peer reviewed by an organization like the National Science Foundation or a select blue ribbon committee.
Based on the history of spaceflight systems development including NASA's own programs performance in meeting planned operational schedules; it would be prudent to look at the risk interval for a longer period than just the currently planned 5 years, perhaps 10 years. While there seems to be anticipation that the COTS providers will find a way to circumvent the technical, cost and schedule problems that NASA and its contractors have faced for recent development programs that hoped for result is yet to be demonstrated. NASA's heritage for its development programs and projects has relied on a benevolent Congress to supplement its budget when the inevitable cost increases come along as a result of development problems. Receiving increased appropriations to solve project development issues looks increasingly unlikely based on what is happening to the Webb Telescope Project and the National budget deficit. The potential COTS providers will similarly face a reluctant group of investors if their costs and problems escalate.
How could this risk mitigated?
The most obvious way to control the risks associated with current NASA planning is to retain the Space Shuttle capability in some form until there is demonstrated American provided capability to transport humans and cargo to and from the ISS. Retention of the Space Shuttle would provide all of the capability to protect the integrity of the Space Station and its science programs. The issue as always is cost; however, the cost model could be significantly moderated by commercializing the Space Shuttle Program. Estimates are that a commercial venture could operate the Space Shuttle for a couple flights per year at perhaps 1/3 of its current cost. The critical skills are still available at this time. This would enable America to continue the same capability to support the ISS, and even conduct other priority earth orbit missions such as American controlled human access to space to support a critical unforeseen national security need.
By establishing commercialized Space Shuttle operations, NASA can take a known and reliable flight system and use it to develop and transition the governance and oversight processes needed for the COTS era operations. In addition to mitigating the risks and uncertainties associated with current NASA plans, America would retain its prominence as a leading participant in human space flight. A professionally done peer reviewed risk assessment will define the risks with their associated uncertainties and highlight where mitigations must be taken. To do otherwise places reliance on hope over experience.
7/20/2011
Unassessed Uncertainty Involved For the Future of American Human Spaceflight.
NASA now likely has much more risk to the long term sustainability and safety of its premier human spaceflight program (ISS) than the normally risk averse Agency would desire or admit to. Flight crew access to and from the ISS for the next 5 or more years is dependent on a single flight system (Soyuz), until one of the commercially developed American low earth orbit transportation systems demonstrates sufficient reliability to take on that responsibility. The widespread euphoria over the recent successes of SpaceX and the highly optimistic expectations for COTS operational readiness somewhat contrasts with the reality of the history of past rocket development programs. The cost, schedule, and program management difficulties and technical development issues associated with NASA's own Constellation program and the James Webb Space Telescope program most recently have validated that history.
After the Columbia accident, NASA was extremely fortunate that the Soyuz system could sustain the ISS until the Orbiter returned to flight status. There is no planned backup available for the Soyuz after retirement of the Space Shuttle flight system for five or perhaps even several more years.
There is a non-zero probability that a random event or a scenario comprised of a series of seemingly unconnected events could prevent the Soyuz or a reliable COTS alternate capability from being available for transporting crews safely to and from the ISS for a significant length of time perhaps resulting in abandonment of the Station. Reliance on the Soyuz for this extended timeframe is very unpopular with many Americans of all stripes for a variety of reasons. If this capability becomes unreliable or perhaps utilized as some form of political leverage, NASA now has no other options available to sustain its planned ISS operations program for perhaps a long period of time.
We know that there is tangible uncertainty and risk involved in the current strategy to rely on a single human transportation system for long term access to the ISS that is provided by a foreign entity. What is the likelihood that a random event or a here-to-fore unconsidered scenario might occur that could cause a significant impact to the ISS Program? Second, are the impacts of the potential consequences acceptable to America; and what are the best mitigation strategies to address this risk? What does NASA and the Government need to do to characterize the risks involved to provide useable information for use by the decision makers who accountable for this policy, and to provide transparency and confidence to the affected stakeholders?
What are some of these non-zero probability events that could present major risk?
1. Spacecraft systems failures/deficiencies (hardware/software) or supply chain interruptions.
2. Ground support system failures, aging institutions and facilities.
3. Political Instability or irresolvable policy differences affecting the continuity of planned arrangements
4. Fire that disrupts and disables key manufacturing, utilities, or operations capabilities.
5. Terrorist attacks to key capabilities, physical, cyber, etc.
6. Major weather disaster that impacts key manufacturing or operations capabilities, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant as an example. .
7. Human error that initiates a scenario comprised of events which renders the Soyuz system unavailable for a lengthy period.
8. The uncertainty in performance of the potential COTS providers being able to provide a safe and reliable human transportation system to support the ISS in a reasonable time frame. In comparison, the development of the Orion led by NASA, also a capsule flight system with significant legacy utilization, was taking NASA greater than 10 years to realize a LEO capability to support the ISS.
This is a partial listing of potential causes and is not intended to be a complete list of scenarios that might result in the Soyuz and/or the COTS capability being unavailable for human access to the ISS.
What are the potential adverse consequences that might result from failure of the Soyuz system to be able to fly crews to and from the ISS for an extended period of time?
1. Loss of life.
2. Major asset loss. The U.S. has approximately $100 B invested in the ISS that is at risk for loss. Other nations have varying significant investments as well.
3. Loss of prestige for America due to failure to be able to sustain the ISS.
4. Uncontrolled decay and entry of the ISS
5. Acceleration of the wide spread perceived decline and/or actual decline of America's current world leadership in human spaceflight technology and operations.
6. Loss of confidence in NASA, its leadership; and perhaps future support for initiating new future programs.
7. Loss of momentum in the ISS based science programs including loss of the accrued sunk investments in dollars and human capital.
8. Accelerated erosion of the skills and capabilities required to move the human exploration of space forward.
9. Loss of interest in space science and space exploration by the young people who are contemplating a science or aerospace engineering career resulting in further decline in America's capability to initiate and carry out challenging spaceflight and technological programs. (This is already happening – just talk to some science and engineering majors now in college.)
Again, a partial listing.
Who are the stakeholders and policy makers that are potentially impacted by this undefined risk level?
1. The American taxpayers who are committed to American leadership in space and depend on NASA leadership and the Government to make reliable decisions for the betterment of the Nation.
2. The governing Administration.
3. The Congress who appear to be legislating the way forward for human spaceflight by their actions (e.g. Orion & SLS).
4. NASA leadership and its people who have committed their lives and careers to the continued development of human spaceflight..
5. NASA's Contractors that make up much of the skilled experience base necessary to conceive, develop, manufacture, and operate the systems that are required for space exploration..
6. The Commercial Space Transportation investors.
Again, a partial listing, but the stakeholder community is much larger than NASA alone.
How should NASA proceed?
NASA should follow its own policy and procedural directives imposed on its own programs and conduct a detailed risk assessment of its plans in order to understand the risk level associated with the decision to rely solely on the Soyuz flight system for human access and return to the ISS for the next five + years. Since the risks involved are so significant to the future of America, the risk analysis and assessment should be accomplished by an organization independent of the NASA decision makers who are involved in the planning and implementation of current the policy of long term reliance on a flight system provided by a foreign nation to sustain the ISS. In order to avoid a conflict of interest, the use of NASA's current contractors should not be utilized for such an assessment. Perhaps the risk assessment should be overseen and peer reviewed by an organization like the National Science Foundation or a select blue ribbon committee.
Based on the history of spaceflight systems development including NASA's own programs performance in meeting planned operational schedules; it would be prudent to look at the risk interval for a longer period than just the currently planned 5 years, perhaps 10 years. While there seems to be anticipation that the COTS providers will find a way to circumvent the technical, cost and schedule problems that NASA and its contractors have faced for recent development programs that hoped for result is yet to be demonstrated. NASA's heritage for its development programs and projects has relied on a benevolent Congress to supplement its budget when the inevitable cost increases come along as a result of development problems. Receiving increased appropriations to solve project development issues looks increasingly unlikely based on what is happening to the Webb Telescope Project and the National budget deficit. The potential COTS providers will similarly face a reluctant group of investors if their costs and problems escalate.
How could this risk mitigated?
The most obvious way to control the risks associated with current NASA planning is to retain the Space Shuttle capability in some form until there is demonstrated American provided capability to transport humans and cargo to and from the ISS. Retention of the Space Shuttle would provide all of the capability to protect the integrity of the Space Station and its science programs. The issue as always is cost; however, the cost model could be significantly moderated by commercializing the Space Shuttle Program. Estimates are that a commercial venture could operate the Space Shuttle for a couple flights per year at perhaps 1/3 of its current cost. The critical skills are still available at this time. This would enable America to continue the same capability to support the ISS, and even conduct other priority earth orbit missions such as American controlled human access to space to support a critical unforeseen national security need.
By establishing commercialized Space Shuttle operations, NASA can take a known and reliable flight system and use it to develop and transition the governance and oversight processes needed for the COTS era operations. In addition to mitigating the risks and uncertainties associated with current NASA plans, America would retain its prominence as a leading participant in human space flight. A professionally done peer reviewed risk assessment will define the risks with their associated uncertainties and highlight where mitigations must be taken. To do otherwise places reliance on hope over experience.
7/20/2011
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