Wednesday, May 15, 2013

Safety issues with crew modules----Soyuz not manned rated per NASA Requirements


From nasaproblems.com

The Orion MPCV Crew Module is a Death Trap

NASA Management has chosen not to disclose that crew modules have unsolvable safety issues that are inherent to all crew modules. There is historical evidence that validates crew modules have been no safer than the space shuttle. In fact it is by chance that the crew module safety record is not much worst.  Every flight of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) or any of the commercial crew modules will be a "test flight." NASA management has chosen to disregard the perilous "entry" phase of flight where Soyuz cosmonauts were killed when their crew module failed during reentry and the recent near fatal reentry mishaps…all related to manufacturing errors.

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Orion Crew Module Crash Site

The Orion MPCV would be an acceptable risk if there was not a safer option for crew safety. The crew escape modules which can be installed on automatic space shuttles will be that option.

The following NASA release and emails confirm:

·        NASA administrator Charles Bolden issued a NASA release stating the Orion MPCV is designed to be ten times saferduring ascent and entry than its predecessor, the space shuttle. NASA release 11-164(It is impossible to achieve this design goal and there is no analysis supporting this claim!)

·        The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel were notified that that the safety record of crew modules does not support this safety claim and requested their position on the safety of the Orion MPCV (email, dated June 15, 2011).

·        The Chief of the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance in the email (dated June 16, 2011) seemed unaware of NASA release 11-164. However he did confirm that the Orion did not meet their safety requirements at the preliminary design review (PDR) for the Constellation program (Cx). (There is no feasible concept available to make crew modules safer than the space shuttle during entry).

·        The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel elected not to release their position of this safety challenge of Orion MPCV.


Comment: The NASA safety office continues to remain silent on the unsupported Orion MPCV safety claim. 

 

Dismal Flight History of Crew Modules:

 

Launch Escape Tower Failure - May 2009 – The Soyuz escape tower suffered a central thrust chamber malfunction. Manufacturing error suspected.

Entry Module Failures

Strato Lab V – Crewman drowned during ocean retrival.

Strato-Lab V

Mercury Liberty Bell 7 – Lost capsule but save crewman during ocean retrival.

Soyuz 1 – Cosmonaut killed on landing.

Soyuz 11 – Three cosmonauts died from asphyxiation caused by module leakage during entry.

Soyuz 23 – Had near disastrous landing on icy lake.

Soyuz TM-5 – Problem with deorbit engine…computer failure.

Soyuz TMA-1 - Ballistic entry occurred…technical malfunction landed 300 mile off course.

Soyuz TM-10 – Ballistic entry occurred…cable malfunction caused heat shield problem.

Soyuz TM-11 – Same problem as on TM-10…. Manufacturing errors suspected.

 

The failure history of crew modules repeats itself because it flight is a test flight subjected to manufacturing errors. Recover of a crew in any sea state is always a gamble with their lives. The only way to insure any improvement in astronaut safety is to provide crew escape pods and that is only available on an automated space shuttle.

Soyuz 1 Crash Site

soy1crsh.jpg

 

Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods

This is the only viable crew escape/safe haven system and is available only on the CSS.

·       Commercial Space Shuttle Crew Escape Pods

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The orbiter mass property issue is resolved by removing the piloting functions to provide weight margin for the pods (~ 3,700 pounds). Escape pod weigh is 700 pounds per pod. The pods provide protection for all phases of flight. At launch pad and lower altitudes escapes, a ballute deploys to slow the pod for parachute deploy. The pod's life support system provides on-orbit safe haven in the event the cabin pressure is breached. Target lifetime for life support is 20 days to allow for on-orbit rescue. Pods are located behind the nose cone heat shield wake to reduce excessive thermal loads in the event of a Columbia type entry failure. The pod is also equipped with a heat shield system. The pod must be a "smart pod" ... it must have knowledge of the environment.
The crew escape pod is the key to reducing the shuttle operations cost and providing safe access to space for the astronauts. To install the pods requires weight be removed from the cabin area or the forward center of gravity limit would be violated. The only function in the cabin area that is not required for flight operation is the piloting function. All piloting functions can be automated. Automated flight has been conducted for all phase of flight operation. Removing the piloting subsystems (commander and pilot weight, seats, forward flight deck displays and control systems, escape pole, forward windows, etc. ) provides a weight margin of nearly 3,700 pounds that can be used to install the escape pods. The only major roadblock is the steadfast objection of NASA's spaceflight management to carrying astronauts on automated space vehicles. This is an inbred management policy that has festered in the human space programs for far too long!


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